We examine the information content of corporate hedging announcements using a hand-collected sample of 153 hedging policy changes announced by gold mining firms between 1991 and 2008. We observe a strong positive reaction in the gold spot market to hedging decreases, which we show is consistent with the market believing that firms have credible private information about future gold prices. After controlling for the effect of the gold price change, we observe a similarly strong positive (negative) reaction in the stock prices of the firm making the announcement and other gold mining firms to a hedging decrease (increase), suggesting that (a) the announcement also conveys information about a change in the expected future financial condition (cost of financial distress) of both the firm and its industry; and (b) any shareholder benefit of a hedging increase is more than offset by the negative news conveyed by the hedging increase about the change in the firm's expected future financial condition, and vice versa. Our findings also provide new insights into the endogeneity associated with hedging policy changes and its effect on measuring the relation between hedging and the value of the firm. 
"Gold prices soared 8% yesterday, its biggest gain in four months, after Placer Dome Inc. said it was winding down its hedging position in expectation of an improved gold market…. Shares of Placer Dome (PDG/TSE) rose
However, the empirical evidence in support of these hedging rationales is mixed. 3 Additionally, recent studies have documented that a majority of firms use derivatives not only to hedge their risk exposure but also to incorporate market timing into their hedging programs, 4 which suggests that these firms believe they have valuable private information. 5 Yet, very little is known about the informational superiority of firms, although casual empiricism as reflected in the above press 1 See, for example, Allayannis and Weston (2001) , Chidambaran, Fernando and Spindt (2001) , Guay and Kothari (2003) , Adam and Fernando (2006) , Jin and Jorion (2006) , and Mackay and Moeller (2007) . 2 See, for example, Smith and Stulz (1985) , Bessembinder (1991) , Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), and Leland (1998) . 3 See, for example, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) , Tufano (1996) , Mian (1996) , Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) , Haushalter (2000) and Graham and Rogers (2002) . 4 See, for example, Dolde (1993) , Stulz (1996) , Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) , Glaum (2002 ), Faulkender (2005 , Adam and Fernando (2006) , Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) , Beber and Fabbri (2006) , and Géczy, Minton and Schrand (2007) . 5 Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) report that of the 13 gold producers who responded to their survey, only two respondents believed that gold prices were "never predictable," also noting that the two most important factors determining the extent to which the companies in their survey hedged were "a long-term market view on gold prices" and a "short term market view on gold prices."
reports would suggest that markets do react strongly to firms' hedging announcements. 6 However, the literature has failed to document any benefit to shareholders from such selective hedging activity, 7 suggesting that firms may not have as much private information as they think they do.
In this paper, we address these puzzles by studying the information content of hedging announcements, an approach that is new to the corporate risk management literature as far as we are aware but well established in other areas of corporate finance. The hedging announcements in our study are made by a sample of gold mining companies. Our study permits us to reexamine three questions that are currently unresolved in the literature: (a) whether firms have private information about the underlying commodity market; (b) whether changes in hedging policies also reveal private information about the firm and its industry; and (c) whether hedging decisions affect shareholder value. The answer to the first question would shed new light on the pervasive practice of selective hedging while the answers to the second and third questions would provide new evidence on the motives for corporate hedging and the extent to which it is consistent with theoretical rationales especially from the standpoint of maximizing shareholder wealth.
We hand-collect a sample of 153 announcements pertaining to changes in hedging policies made by gold mining companies between 1991 and 2008. Using this sample we test for the informational effects of hedging. First, we study the effect of hedging announcements on the underlying commodity market. To the extent that there is a reaction in the commodity market to hedging announcements, it could be taken as evidence that the market believes the firm is 6 Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) also allude to the market reactions to the Placer Dome and Barrick Gold announcements as providing anecdotal evidence of informational asymmetry between gold producers and the market. 7 See Adam and Fernando (2006) and Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2006) .
informed. Stulz (1996) argues that firms that are informed can enhance shareholder wealth by hedging selectively, i.e., by incorporating their market views into their hedging programs.
Therefore, by examining the informational superiority of commodity firms, we can contribute to our understanding of the potential effects of selective hedging on shareholder wealth.
We find evidence to support the hypothesis that changes in hedging policies provide valuable gold price information to other market participants. Specifically, we find that announcements about decreases in hedging are associated with strong positive abnormal returns in the gold market, with increases in hedging eliciting a considerably weaker negative gold price response. We control for the possibility that any market reaction to hedging announcements may be due, at least in part, to the spot market impact of changes in gold supply due to hedging, by studying the market reaction to announcements of gold sales by central banks. We find that the gold market reacts more strongly to announcements made by gold mining companies than to announcements made by central banks. As central bank announcements are unlikely to be driven by market timing objectives, we regard this as further evidence in support of the information hypothesis, i.e., that markets deduce private gold price information from the hedging announcements of gold mining firms. In the next section we discuss the relevant literature. We develop our empirical hypotheses in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the data and discuss our empirical methodology. We present and discuss our empirical findings pertaining to the gold market impacts in Section 4. We present and discuss our empirical findings pertaining to the equity market impacts in Section 5. In Section 6, we examine whether the hedging changes following announcements by gold mining firms are consistent with the announcements. Section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
The extant literature provides numerous theoretical arguments in support of the notion that corporate hedging creates value for shareholders by mitigating market imperfections that cause departures from a Modigliani-Miller world. First, hedging can reduce firms' expected costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . This argument also suggests that hedging will help firms increase their debt capacity and the tax shields they can realize from debt (Leland, 1998; Graham and Rogers, 2002) . Furthermore, by reducing the cost of financial distress, hedging can also enhance credit quality and reduce the cost of debt financing (Chidambaran, Fernando and Spindt, 2001) . Second, when a firm faces a convex tax function, lowering the volatility of earnings by hedging can help reduce a firm's expected tax burden (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Graham and Smith, 1999) . Finally, growth firms that find external financing to be more expensive than internally generated funds could employ hedging practices to reduce the underinvestment problem by ensuring that they have sufficient internal funds available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993) and by reducing the cost to equity holders of financing these investment opportunities externally (Bessembinder, 1991) .
Empirical studies that examine these theories provide mixed evidence. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) provide evidence suggesting that firms with more convex tax functions, more financial constraints and more growth opportunities hedge more. In contrast, Tufano (1996) finds little evidence in favor of shareholder value maximization theories, instead finding support for the idea that a firm's hedging practices are related to managerial incentives, specifically stock and option compensation. Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) find that firms with greater growth opportunities and firms with greater financial constraints are more likely to employ currency derivatives to hedge their foreign exchange exposure, Haushalter (2000) finds a positive relation between the extent to which a firm hedges and its financial leverage. Neither of the latter two studies find support for notion that hedging is tied to managerial utility or for the tax convexity hypothesis. Graham and Rogers (2002) provide evidence suggesting that although tax convexity does not seem to be a factor in hedging decisions, firms appear to be hedging to increase their debt capacity and thereby increase tax shields. They also find that firms hedge to reduce expected distress costs.
Recent studies have also examined the relation between firm value and hedging. Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that the market value of firms using foreign currency derivatives is 4.87% higher on average than for nonusers. Chidambaran, Fernando and Spindt (2001) show that hedging is associated with an enhancement in a firm's credit quality, thereby lowering financing costs. Graham and Rogers (2002) argue that derivatives-induced debt capacity increases firm value by 1.1% on average. Adam and Fernando (2006) find that their sample of gold mining firms consistently realized abnormal positive cash flows from their derivative transactions due to positive risk premia. They do not find a corresponding increase in systematic risk and hence infer that these derivative transactions increased shareholder value. Mackay and Moeller (2007) find that by hedging concave revenues and leaving concave costs exposed, their sample of 34 oil refiners could have increased their market values between 2% and 3%.
On the other hand, Guay and Kothari (2003) find that for most of their sample firms, the cash flow and market value sensitivities to their derivative portfolios are small relative to the magnitude of sensitivities to traditional measures of economic exposures. Jin and Jorion (2006) study 119 oil and gas companies and find that hedging does not affect market value of these companies although it does lower their stock price sensitivity to oil and gas prices.
Furthermore, recent studies have documented that many firms not only hedge but also speculate with derivatives by varying the size and timing of their derivatives transactions based on their market views, a practice known as "selective hedging." For example, Dolde (1993) reports that almost 90% of firms in his survey of 244 Fortune 500 firms at least sometimes base the size of their hedges on their views of future market movements. Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) survey derivatives policies by 399 U.S. non-financial firms and find that about 50% of their sample firms admit to sometimes (and 10% frequently) altering the size and/or the timing of a hedge based on their market views. Glaum (2002) surveys the risk management practices of the major non-financial firms in Germany and finds that the majority follows forecast-based, profitoriented risk management strategies. These findings suggests that the practice of hedging departs considerably from the underlying assumption in the theoretical literature that firms use derivatives to reduce risk, not to speculate.
For selective hedging to be value increasing, Stulz (1996) argues that firms would need to possess private information about future market prices and the ability to act on this information without jeopardizing their core businesses. Adam and Fernando (2006) find considerable evidence of selective hedging in their sample of gold mining firms but find no economically significant cash flow gains on average from selective hedging. Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter (2006) also study selective hedging in the gold mining industry and arrive at a similar conclusion. While these findings do not rule out the possibility that some gold mining firms are privately informed about future gold prices, they suggest that the firms that do engage in speculation are unlikely to be privately informed. The evidence provided by Adam, Fernando and Salas (2009) lends some support to the view that speculation is not driven by private information. It does not, however, rule out the possibility that some firms may possess private information about future gold prices, which could potentially influence other aspects of their hedging behavior and the overall gold market as well.
Empirical Hypotheses
The literature reviewed in the previous section suggests that finance researchers have failed to arrive at a consensus on whether firms have private information about the underlying commodity market and whether hedging decisions affect shareholder value. In addition, the question of whether changes in hedging policies also reveal private information about the firm and its industry has not been previously addressed in the literature. In this section we develop a series of empirical hypotheses that are aimed at examining these questions based on how the gold and stock markets react to hedging announcements.
If a commodity firm announces a change in its hedging policy, it is possible that in doing so it will reveal (a) any private information it has about future gold prices and/or (b) private information about changes in the firm's financial condition that precipitated the hedging change, while also allowing for the possibility that a change in hedging policy could, all else equal, signal a change in the value of the firm as predicted by hedging theory. We develop our first set of hypotheses based on "(a)" to examine the gold price impact of the announcement and our second set of hypotheses based on "(b)" to examine the firm and industry impact of the announcement.
A. Announcement effect of hedging change on the gold price
If a commodity firm that has private information about the price of the commodity announces a change in its hedging policy and other market participants believe that the firm's information is of value, they can be expected to draw inferences about the firm's expectation of future commodity prices. Consider, for example, a commodity company that has just announced that it is closing out all its hedge positions. The market could construe this change in policy as a credible signal of the firm's greater confidence in the future prospects for the commodity. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
H1a (Information hypothesis): An announcement of an increase (decrease) in hedging by a commodity firm will be associated with a negative (positive) abnormal return in the corresponding commodity market.
The commodity market may also react to changes in hedging policies because hedging transactions can affect the supply in the gold markets and therefore the spot price of the commodity, and not necessarily because of the signaling power of the announcement. 8 For example, if a gold mining firm initiates a hedging program by selling gold forward, the counterparty to the transaction will typically hedge its exposure by borrowing gold and selling it in the spot market, thereby increasing the spot supply. The possibility of a potential market impact associated with changes in hedging policies leads us to our next hypothesis:
H1b (Market impact hypothesis): An announcement of an increase (decrease) in hedging by commodity firms will be associated with negative (positive) abnormal returns in the corresponding commodity market and will be related only to the potential market supply change associated with the announcement.
While both the information hypothesis and the market impact hypothesis predict the same directional change in response to the announcement, a unique prediction of the market impact hypothesis is that the spot market reaction associated with the hedging change should depend only on the quantity of gold involved and not on any other attribute of the hedging announcement or of the company making the announcement. Therefore, while these two hypotheses are complementary, the above distinction allows us to empirically test for both information and market impact effects.
Additionally, we can also separate out information and market impact driven gold price movements by examining the gold sales of entities that are unlikely to be in the market for information reasons. Central banks periodically rebalance their treasury portfolios by selling their gold reserves. Typically, the reasons for these sales are other than those associated with market timing. For example, Russia sold significant quantities of gold in the early 1990s to repay its international debt and the United Kingdom reduced its gold reserve by half between 1998 and 2004, in order to diversify and reduce risk. These sales provide us with an ideal control sample to measure and segregate the informational content and market impact of commodity firm announcements. If the information hypothesis is valid, we would observe hedging announcements by commodity firms to cause a larger reaction in the commodity market than announcements by central banks.
H1c:
A hedging announcement by a commodity firm will be associated with larger abnormal returns in the commodity market than a gold sale announcement made by a central bank.
B. Announcement effect of hedging change on equity prices
Second, we study the effect of hedging announcements on stock prices. In addition to revealing information about the firm's expectation of gold prices, a change in hedging policy could also signal either a move designed to increase (or decrease) the benefits of hedging predicted by hedging theory and/or a readjustment in the level of hedging in response to a change in the firm's financial condition. 9 Under the former argument, hedging theory would lead us to expect a stock price increase (decrease) if the firm increased (decreased) its hedging. Under the latter argument, an increase in hedging could signal that a firm's probability of financial distress has increased (thereby increasing the need for hedging) and we would expect to observe a decrease in the stock price (albeit partially mitigated by any benefits of an increase in hedging), whereas a decrease in hedging could signal that the firm's probability of financial distress has decreased (thereby decreasing the need for hedging) which would lead us to expect an increase in the stock price (albeit partially suppressed by the adverse effects of a decrease in hedging).
These arguments lead us to our next two hypotheses:
H2a (Optimal hedge): An announcement of an increase (decrease) in hedging by a commodity firm will be associated with a positive (negative) abnormal return in its stock price.
H2b (Readjustment to financial condition): An announcement of an increase (decrease) in
hedging by a commodity firm will be associated with a negative (positive) abnormal return in its stock price.
Furthermore, after controlling for the amount of information asymmetry, the optimal hedge hypothesis would also predict that firms with higher leverage will react more positively to an increase in hedging and more negatively to a decrease in hedging. In contrast, the readjustment to financial condition hypothesis would predict that firms with higher leverage will react more negatively to an increase in hedging and more positively to a decrease in hedging. This yields our next two hypotheses:
H2c (Level of distress and optimal hedge): Firms exposed to a higher level of financial distress will react more positively (negatively) to an announcement of an increase (decrease) in hedging.
H2d (Level of distress and readjustment to financial condition): Firms exposed to a higher level of financial distress will react more negatively (positively) to an announcement of an increase (decrease) in hedging.
Jorion and Zhang (2007) find that credit events, such as Chapter 11 and 7 bankruptcies and large jumps in credit default swap spreads, are associated with industry wide contagion effects rather than competition effects. To the extent that changes in hedging policy by a firm due to expected gold price changes also implies a change in the probability of financial distress due to the gold price change, we should expect to find industry wide contagion effects of hedging announcements over and above the direct effect of changes in gold prices. In contrast, if the change in hedging policy by an individual firm is simply a move designed to increase (or decrease) the benefits of hedging predicted by hedging theory as in our optimal hedge hypothesis, there should be no contagion effect for other firms in the industry that do not change their hedging policy. Accordingly, we state our final two hypotheses:
H2e (Industry contagion and optimal hedge): An announcement of an increase (decrease) in hedging by a commodity firm will have no effect on the equity market returns of other firms in the same commodity industry.
H2f (Industry contagion and readjustment to financial condition): An announcement of an increase (decrease) in hedging by a commodity firm will be associated with a negative (positive) abnormal return in the equity market for other firms in the same commodity industry.
Data and Methodology
We use a Factiva guided search to hand-collect announcements made by individual firms Table 3 provides further details on the central bank announcement sample. Although 54% of the observations are from the Canadian Central Bank, we later show that the gold market reactions to Canadian announcements are not significantly different reactions to the rest of the announcements.
[Place Table 3 about here] 11 Although it can be argued that futures prices are more appropriate for testing the information hypothesis, it must be noted that the spot-future arbitrage relationship ensures that changes in spot prices reflect changes in the entire term-structure of gold prices. Furthermore, lack of data on the maturity of forward contracts associated with our hedging announcements makes using futures prices impractical. 12 We find no central bank gold purchase announcements during our study period.
We test our empirical hypotheses using standard event study methodologies and OLS regressions. To estimate the abnormal returns in the commodity market, we employ a meanadjusted methodology. The mean or expected return is calculated based on returns from day -110
to -10, where the day of the hedging announcement is identified as day zero. Since we are able to accurately establish the timing of the hedging announcements, we use a one-day event window
(day zero) for the study.
As shown by Tufano (1998), gold mining firms have a significant exposure to gold price risk. Also, Tufano (1998) documents that other variables such as interest rates and exchange rates do not enter as significant factors in the gold mining firm market model. Accordingly, we employ a two-factor model to measure the abnormal returns in the equity market. The expected return model for firm i on day t is shown below:
where i,t R is the total daily return on stock i from t-1 to t, Mkt ,t R is the daily return on CRSP value-weighted index, and Gold ,t R is the return on the near-month gold contract traded on the NYMEX. 13 For robustness, we also employ a five-factor model that adds the Fama-French factors and the momentum factor the two-factor model. The five-factor model is as follows:
where SMB t , HML t , and UMD t are the returns to the Small-Minus-Big, High-Minus-Low, and Up-MinusDown portfolios meant to capture size, book-to-market, and return momentum effects, respectively. 
It should be noted that according to the null of hypotheses H1a and H2b, average
UnSigned_CARs should be positive. We also use Direction = -1 for obtaining the UnSigned CARs for central bank gold sales when those observations are pooled with the corporate hedging announcements in our cross-sectional analysis.
Announcement Effects in the Gold Market

A. Gold returns and hedging announcements
We first examine the effect of hedging announcements on abnormal returns in the gold market. Results for the event studies for hedging decreases and increases are presented in Table   4 .
[Place Table 4 about here]
Panel A of Table 4 indicates that the mean abnormal gold return for the event day in response to a hedging decrease is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
The gold CARs of 0.5% and 0.6% on the event day and 3-day interval around it, respectively, are also economically significant. There is some evidence of a gold price run-up prior to the announcement and no evidence of a reversal of the announcement return in the ten days following the event.
Panel B of Table 4 The market impact hypothesis also predicts that announcements regarding increases (decreases) in hedging will be associated with decreases (increases) in gold abnormal returns.
Consequently, we conduct two tests to distinguish between the information and market impact hypotheses: a cross-sectional regression of unsigned abnormal returns and a comparison of the impact of announcements made by commodity companies with the impact of announcements made by central banks.
A.1. Cross-Sectional regressions of Unsigned Gold abnormal returns
Here we use the combined hedging decrease-increase sample to examine the relationship between abnormal returns in the gold market, and different attributes of the event and the firm making the announcement. The overall idea is that if the market impact hypothesis is to prevail, the abnormal returns should be related only to the expected change in quantity of hedging and not to any other attribute of the event or the firm. The results of the regressions are presented in Table 5 . It is important to note that the dummy variable Market View is consistently significant and positive across different specifications. This implies that the reaction in the gold market is much stronger when the firm making the announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is a result of its expectation about future gold prices. The use of the Market View dummy helps us differentiate between the information and the market impact hypotheses, and our findings strongly support the former. While a positive coefficient on the hedging quantity change variable could be interpreted as evidence in support of either the market impact or the information hypothesis (the latter because bigger adjustments in private information may be associated with larger hedging changes), we find that the hedging quantity change coefficient is not statistically significant.
[Place Table 5 about here]
To the extent that the proportion of change in hedging can be considered as a proxy for the strength of the signal, the information hypothesis would predict a positive sign on the variable. The results indicate that although the variable has a positive sign it is not statistically different from zero. We employ a dummy variable Big Five to proxy for firm size. The dummy variable is equal to 1 when the firm making the announcement is one of the five largest firms in the sample. As argued by Stulz (1996) 
B. Comparison of Central Bank and Commodity Company announcements
Results for the central bank announcement event study and cross-sectional analysis are presented in Tables 6 and 7 , respectively, again using unsigned CARs for consistency, which results in all central bank announcement CARs being multiplied by -1 since they all pertain to gold sales. While central bank gold sale announcements result in negative abnormal returns in the gold market, the event day CAR (-0.1%) is only weakly statistically significant. Table 7 reports the results for the cross-sectional regression. Unlike in the hedging announcements regression, we find that the CAR increases with the quantity of gold sold, although the impact is statistically significant only at the 10% level. Similar to the hedging announcements regression, the Ex post dummy is insignificant, which further stresses the opaqueness of the gold market.
Although our sample is dominated by Canadian Central Bank announcements, the results indicate that this feature of the dataset has no bearing on the observed gold market abnormal returns. Overall, our results provide weak support for the market impact hypothesis, which is not surprising considering that some of the central bank gold sales (especially by the IMF and the French, German and Swiss Central Banks) are several orders of magnitude larger than the average firm hedging change.
[Place Tables 6 and 7 about here]
To further test the validity of the information hypothesis, we compare the announcements made by central banks with announcements made by commodity companies. The results are reported in Table 8 . The Company dummy variable is positive and significant at the 5% level.
This implies that, all else equal, the gold market reacts significantly more strongly when the announcement is made by a commodity company than when the announcement is made by a central bank. Clearly, this result is strongly in favor of the information hypothesis. We also find that the CAR increases with the quantity of gold sold. Our previous findings reported in Tables 5 and 7 suggest that this result is driven by the central bank sales and does not invalidate the evidence in support of the information hypothesis.
[Place Table 8 about here] To summarize, our findings in this section provide strong evidence in favor of the information hypothesis, which implies that gold market participants credibly infer a firm's change in expectation of future gold prices from hedging decreases. In contrast, our findings in support of the information hypothesis for hedging increases are considerably weaker, either due to our smaller sample or due to an asymmetry in the ways the gold market deduces hedging decreases and increases. While we find weak evidence in support of the market impact hypothesis from our study of central bank gold sales, this finding does not weaken our findings in support of the information hypothesis for corporate hedging announcements.
Announcement Effects in the Equity Market
A. Equity returns and hedging announcements
We next examine the effect of hedging announcements on the equity market and analyze the relation between abnormal returns in the equity market and characteristics of the firm making the announcement and of the announcement itself. Table 9 presents results from event studies on hedging decreases and increases, respectively. In Panels A and C, abnormal returns are calculated using a two-factor model to control for daily changes in gold prices and hence, cannot be attributed to any information related to gold prices. As reported in Panel A of Table 9 , the mean abnormal return on the event day in response to a hedging decrease is +1.49%, which is highly significant both economically and statistically (at the 1% level). Further, there is no evidence of mean reversion in abnormal returns. As reported in Panel C of Table 9 , the mean abnormal return on the event day in response to a hedging increase is negative (-2.05%) and highly significant. Similar to the hedging decreases sample, there is no evidence of mean reversion in abnormal returns. As reported in Panels B and D, the results are substantively identical when using a five-factor model that includes the gold factor together with the Fama-French and momentum factors. 16 In sum, increases (decreases) in hedging result in strong negative (positive) abnormal returns that are 16 A change in hedging policy by itself can change a firm's gold beta. In such a case, abnormal returns obtained from gold betas estimated using pre-event data might be inaccurate. To address this concern, we re-run our event studies using gold betas estimated from post-event data. In unreported results, we find that the event-day reactions are qualitatively similar to those reported here.
statistically and economically significant. These results are in accordance with the hypothesis that firms change their hedging policy in response to a change in their financial condition (especially their cost of financial distress), perhaps tied to their new gold price forecast. Our finding suggests that changes in hedging policies reveal hitherto private information about the firm's financial condition and hence signal changes in firm value.
[Place Table 9 about here] Next, we examine the relationship between equity abnormal returns, and firm and event characteristics. The results of the cross-sectional regression are presented in Tables 10 and 11 .
Unsigned event-day abnormal return is the dependent variable in all the specifications. In Table   10 the abnormal returns are obtained from the two-factor model and in Table 11 they are obtained from the five-factor model. Tables 10 and 11 report several noteworthy results, and the results in the two tables are substantively identical.
[Place Tables 10 and 11 about here] First, the Market View variable is again positive and significant in all the models. This implies that the greater the content of information regarding future gold prices, the stronger is the reaction in the equity market.
Second, information asymmetry (Info_Assy) is negatively related to unsigned abnormal returns. We use information asymmetry to proxy for costs of external financing. As argued by Froot, Sharfstein and Stein (1993) , firms with higher costs of external financing are expected to derive more benefits from hedging. While our event study findings point to a negative relation between hedging increases and the change in firm value due to the signaling of private information about the firm's financial condition, information asymmetry appears to attenuate this effect, which is consistent with the prediction of Froot, Sharfstein and Stein (1993) . Therefore, our finding suggests that when a firm with high information asymmetry announces an increase (decrease) in hedging, the market will react less negatively (positively) than it would for a firm with low information asymmetry, due to the higher hedging benefits realized by firms with high information asymmetry.
Third, leverage (Distress) is positively related to unsigned abnormal returns in all the specifications, which implies that highly levered firms react more positively (negatively) to decreases (increases) in hedging than other firms. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that firms with more leverage are expected to derive greater benefits from hedging than their counterparts with less leverage. Our finding suggests that the signal about the change in a firm's financial condition implied by the hedging change is amplified by leverage despite more levered firms deriving higher benefits from hedging.
Finally, we find weak evidence that firms with more tax savings (tax savings) react less positively (negatively) to hedging decreases (increases). In accordance with Tufano (1996), we use the total tax loss carry forward variable to proxy for the convexity of the firm's tax schedule.
This finding is in line with the theory put forth by Smith and Stulz (1985) that greater convexity of tax schedule should lead to greater benefits from hedging.
In sum, there appears to be strong evidence in favor of the readjustment to financial condition hypothesis: changes in hedging policies reveal private information about the firm (perhaps arising from a revision in their gold price forecast) and hence affect shareholder wealth.
B. Industry effects of hedging announcements
Finally, we examine the industry-wide contagion effects of hedging announcements made by commodity firms by studying the impact of the announcement on all firms in the gold mining industry (SIC = 1041) excluding the firm making the announcement. The results for industry effects of hedging decreases and increases are presented in Table 12 . In line with the industry contagion hypothesis, we find that hedging increases (decreases) by individual firms are associated with strong and highly significant negative (positive) abnormal returns for the rest of the industry. Furthermore, there is no evidence of mean reversion in abnormal returns in either of the cases. As in our previous analysis for the announcing firms, it should also be noted that because abnormal returns are calculated using both two-and five-factor models that account for daily changes in gold prices, these reported contagion effects cannot be attributed to changes in gold prices. This evidence adds further credence to the argument that changes in hedging policies convey information about changes in the expected financial condition of commodity firms, associated with the revised gold price forecast implied by the hedging announcement.
[Place Table 12 about here]
Next, we examine the relationship between day 0 abnormal returns experienced by gold mining firms (excluding the firm making the announcement), and their characteristics and event attributes. The results of this cross-sectional analysis are presented in Table 13 . Unsigned eventday abnormal return obtained from the two-factor model is the dependent variable in all the specifications. 17 Although the industry-wide cross-sectional regression results are weaker than those obtained for firms making the hedging announcements, they are still largely consistent with the readjustment to financial condition hypothesis. Specifically, we find that leverage (Distress) is positive and significant in three of the four model specifications. More importantly, we find that the leverage results hold even after controlling for the level of information asymmetry (Info_Asy). The Market View variable is positive in all the specifications but is significant only in two of them. Again, the quantity of change in hedging (Hedging Quantity Change) is insignificant in all specifications, which further invalidates the market impact hypothesis.
[Place Table 13 about proportion of yearly production drops by 10.42% in one quarter and 36.52% in one year after the announcement of a hedging decrease. Both these changes are statistically significant at the 1% level. This result helps to confirm the credibility of corporate hedging announcements and is consistent with our finding that the equity and gold markets react to hedging announcements.
Gold mining firms follow up their announcements with actions, thereby reinforcing the credibility of their announcements as signals of changes in expectations of future gold prices and bankruptcy risks.
[Place Table 14 about here]
Conclusions
We examine the informational effects of hedging changes on gold prices and shareholder wealth. We use a hand-collected sample of 153 announcements related to changes in hedging policies made by gold mining companies between 1991 and 2008. We hypothesize that changes in hedging policies provide incremental information to other market participants about changes in expected gold prices and corresponding changes in a firm's expected financial condition. We find strong evidence in favor of these hypotheses. Specifically, we find that announcements about decreases in hedging are associated with strong positive abnormal returns in the gold market, with increases in hedging eliciting a considerably weaker negative gold price response.
To differentiate between the market impact hypothesis -that hedging announcements move spot market prices due to the implied change in market supply -and the information hypothesis, we examine the relation between gold market abnormal returns and event characteristics. We find that gold market reactions are stronger when firms change their hedging policies because of their stated view of the future market price of gold. Also, we find that the gold market reacts more strongly to announcements made by gold mining companies than to announcements made by central banks. As central bank announcements are unlikely to be driven by market timing objectives, we regard this as further evidence in support of the information hypothesis.
Further, we argue that changes in hedging policies reveal private information about changes in a firm's expected financial condition (especially costs of financial distress), perhaps associated with the revised gold price forecast imputed by the market from the hedging change.
In support of this hypothesis we find that, after controlling for gold market returns, announcements of increases (decreases) in hedging are associated with negative (positive) abnormal market returns in the corresponding firm's equity, and we also find similar industrywide contagion effects of hedging announcements. In a cross-sectional regression, we find that firms with higher leverage react more positively (negatively) to decreases (increases) in hedging.
In summary, we add to the literature on corporate risk management by being the first to systematically study the informativeness of corporate hedging announcements and by showing that hedging announcements reveal private information about both the underlying commodity market and the expected financial condition of firms and the industry. Our findings shed valuable new insights on the endogeneity associated with hedging policy changes and highlight the need to better control for this endogeneity in studies that examine the relation between hedging and the value of the firm. Since hedging practices are widespread across many industries and economic segments, the implications of our study extend well beyond the gold industry.
Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Big Five Binary variable equal to 1 for the 5 largest companies in the sample.
CAR_Pre CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Returns) between event days -20 and -1.
CAR_Pre_Gold CAR, in the gold market, between event days -20 and -1.
Company
Binary variable equal to 1 when the announcement is made by a company.
Distress/Leverage Ratio of long-term debt and total assets for the fiscal year preceding the announcement.
Ex Post Binary variable equal to 1 when an announcement is made after the gold is sold. Hedge Quantity Change Natural logarithm of the absolute change in ounces of gold being hedged.
Hedge Proportion Change
Ratio of Hedge Quantity Change and the following year's annual production.
Inc_Dec Binary variable equal to 1 when the announcement is related to an increase in hedging.
Information Asymmetry
Percentage error is analyst's annual earnings forecasts for the fiscal year preceding the announcement.
Institutional Ownership
Ratio of total number of shares owned by institutions and total number of shares outstanding for the fiscal year preceding the announcement.
Market View
Binary variable equal to 1 when the firm making the hedging related announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is a result of its expectations about future gold prices.
Quantity
Natural logarithm of quantity of gold (in ounces) being sold.
Quick Ratio Ratio of current assets and current liabilities for the fiscal year preceding the announcement.
Size Natural logarithm of the firm's total assets in millions of US$ for the fiscal year preceding the announcement.
Tax Savings Ratio of tax loss carry forwards and total assets for the fiscal year preceding the announcement.
Uncontaminated
Binary variable equal to 1 for announcements uncontaminated by other events. CAR_Pre is the CAR between event days -20 and -1. The p-values are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are presented, within brackets, below the respective coefficients. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test.
Variable In Panels A and C, the abnormal returns are calculated using a two-factor model which includes commodity returns (gold, spot) along with the standard equity market returns. In Panels B and D, the abnormal returns are calculated using a five-factor model which adds the Fama French factors and the momentum factor to the aforementioned twofactor model. Portfolio Time-Series t is the Brown and Warner test statistic that accounts for cross-sectional dependence of abnormal returns and Generalized Sign Z is the non-parametric test statistic value. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. The dependent variable is the event-day equity abnormal return. CAR_Pre_Gold is the CAR, in the commodity market, between event days -20 and -1. CAR_Pre is the CAR, in equity market, between event days -20 and -1. Hedge Quantity Change is the change in the log of ounces of gold being hedged. Hedge Proportion Change is the ratio of Hedge Quantity Change and the following year's annual production. Market View is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm making the hedging related announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is a result of its expectations about future gold prices. Big Five is a binary variable equal to 1 for the 5 largest companies in the sample. Size is the log of total assets of the firm (in millions) making the announcement. Info_Asy is the percentage error in analysts' forecasts. Distress is the ratio of long-term debt to firm size. Tax Savings is the ratio of deferred taxes and firm size. Uncontaminated is a dummy variable equal to 1 for uncontaminated events. Inc_Dec is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the announcement is related to an increase in hedging. The p-values are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are presented, within brackets, below the respective coefficients. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. CAR_Pre_Gold is the CAR, in the commodity market, between event days -20 and -1. CAR_Pre is the CAR, in equity market, between event days -20 and -1. Hedge Quantity Change is the change in the log of ounces of gold being hedged. Hedge Proportion Change is the ratio of Hedge Quantity Change and the following year's annual production. Market View is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm making the hedging related announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is a result of its expectations about future gold prices. Big Five is a binary variable equal to 1 for the 5 largest companies in the sample. Size is the log of total assets of the firm (in millions) making the announcement. Info_Asy is the percentage error in analysts' forecasts. Distress is the ratio of long-term debt to firm size. Tax Savings is the ratio of deferred taxes and firm size. Uncontaminated is a dummy variable equal to 1 for uncontaminated events. Inc_Dec is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the announcement is related to an increase in hedging. The p-values are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are presented, within brackets, below the respective coefficients. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. In Panels A and C, the abnormal returns are calculated using a two-factor model which includes commodity returns (gold, spot) along with the standard equity market returns. In Panels B and D, the abnormal returns are calculated using a five-factor model which adds the Fama French factors and the momentum factor to the aforementioned two-factor model. Portfolio Time-Series t is the Brown and Warner test statistic that accounts for cross-sectional dependence of abnormal returns and Generalized Sign Z is the non-parametric test statistic value. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. (event) . CAR_Pre_Gold is the CAR, in the commodity market, between event days -20 and -1. CAR_Pre is the CAR, in equity market, between event days -20 and -1. Hedge Quantity Change is the change in the log of ounces of gold being hedged. Hedge Proportion Change is the ratio of Hedge Quantity Change and the following year's annual production. Market View is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm making the hedging related announcement explicitly claims that the change in hedging policy is a result of its expectations about future gold prices. Big Five is a binary variable equal to 1 for the 5 largest companies in the sample. Size is the log of total assets of the firm (in millions) making the announcement.
Info_Asy is the percentage error in analysts' forecasts. Distress is the ratio of long-term debt to firm size. Uncontaminated is a dummy variable equal to 1 for uncontaminated events. Inc_Dec is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the announcement is related to an increase in hedging. The p-values are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are presented, within brackets, below the respective coefficients. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. 
